New NJ Statutes , Recent cases and Court Rules: May 2019

Thursday, May 16, 2019

Municipal Court 101 Seminar Speakers: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq. Orange Prosecutor Gracia Montilus, Esq., Peter H. Lederman, Esq., Joshua H. Reinitz, Esq., Ronald P. Mondello, Esq.,

Municipal Court 101 Seminar

Speakers:

Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq.

Orange Prosecutor Gracia Montilus, Esq.,

Peter H. Lederman, Esq.,

Joshua H. Reinitz, Esq.,
Ronald P. Mondello, Esq.,

Also speaking Hon. Ashlie C. Gibbons J.M.C., Newark Municipal Court
Hon. Harry D. Norton Jr., J.M.C., Pascack Joint Municipal Court

May 15 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Central Ballroom A/B

NJSBA Annual Meeting Wednesday

Borgata Hotel 1 Borgata Way, Atlantic City, NJ 08401

Description:
This is an introduction to municipal court for recently admitted attorneys or for attorneys who is new to the practice area or wants a refresher. Experienced practitioners and judges will discuss important procedures, practical information and practice tips.

https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/MeetingsEvents/2019AnnualMeetingandConvention/EducationalAgenda.aspx

Law Students free (must register by phone or faxed in registration form)For more information, call NJSBA meetings Dept at 732-249-5000

______________

Free Office Space for Transitional or New Attorney and work with Metuchen Public Defender and go to Court & Mentor program- Edison, NJ

The Metuchen Public Defender Kenneth Vercammen has a space sharing opportunity for new lawyer or recent Transitional attorney to get experience and go to court and learn NJ Law office procedures and handle some Municipal court cases. This is a mentoring experience where you can learn NJ Law Office Procedure. If interested, fax, mail, fax or email a resume and cover letter.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, Esq. Metuchen Public Defender

2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500

(Fax) 732-572-0030 vercammenlaw@njlaws.comhttps://www.njlaws.com/office_space.html

NJ Bar Convention with Assembly leader Jon Bramnick R

Wednesday, May 15, 2019

No automatic obstruction here to fail to cooperate with police STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ELELAKE J. JEFFERSON, JR.,

No automatic obstruction here to fail to cooperate with police

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

ELELAKE J. JEFFERSON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

Argued November 8, 2018 â€“ Decided December 17, 2018

Before Judges Fuentes and Vernoia.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-06-1551.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5593-16T1
PER CURIAM
Defendant Elelake J. Jefferson, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction,

entered after a bench trial, finding him guilty of the disorderly persons offense

of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function in violation

of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). Based on our review of the record, we find there is

insufficient evidence supporting the conviction, and reverse.

Defendant was charged in an indictment with fourth-degree obstruction of

the administration of law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)

(count one), third-degree possession of a stolen handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a)

(count two), fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d)

(count three), and second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(b)(1) (count four). Defendant's trial took place over three days.

The evidence showed that on January 22, 2016, officers from the South

Orange and Montclair police departments investigated an incident in South

Orange that involved a motor vehicle. 1 At approximately 3:00 a.m., officers

went to the Montclair home defendant shared with his parents in search of the

vehicle, but it was not present in the driveway or street. A few hours later,

1
The trial record does not include any details concerning the nature or type of
the incident. The record reflects that the court made a pretrial ruling excluding
evidence at trial concerning the incident under investigation.
A-5593-16T1
2
Montclair police officers observed the vehicle in the driveway of defendant 's

home.

At approximately 7:00 a.m., South Orange Detectives Brian McGuire and

Ernesto Morillo went to the home, where they met Montclair Detectives Joe

Anderson and Pierre Falaise and other officers. The home was "recessed from

the street." In a conversation that "was not particularly loud," officers were

instructed to secure the rear of the house to ensure that no one left the house

when the detectives approached its front door.

The detectives knocked on the front door, and defendant's father, Elelake

Jefferson Sr., answered. Detective Falaise told Jefferson Sr. that the detectives

"were looking to speak with his son." It was cold outside, and the detectives

asked if they could enter the home. Jefferson Sr. allowed the detectives to enter,

where they stood in the foyer and spoke with him.

Detective Falaise testified defendant's bedroom was located off of the

hallway that extended directly from the foyer into the home. Detective Morillo

explained that Jefferson Sr. said he believed defendant was home because the

bed in the room was unmade, a space heater next to the bed was on and

defendant's keys were in the room. According to Detective Falaise, defendant

A-5593-16T1
3
did not leave the bedroom or traverse the hallway and enter the basement door

while the detectives were in the home.

As the detectives stood with Jefferson Sr. in the hallway, there was a noise

"like something falling, maybe metal, something metal hitting the ground, like

a crash." Detective Falaise asked Jefferson Sr. if anyone else was in the house,

and Jefferson Sr. said "it might be" defendant. According to Detective Falaise,

he asked Jefferson Sr. if they could "check to see if it was" defendant

"downstairs" where "[i]t sounded like [the noise] was coming from." Detective

Falaise testified Jefferson Sr. led him and Detective Anderson down the hallway

to the basement door.

As Detectives Falaise and Anderson went into the basement, they said,

"Montclair Police. Is there anyone down here?" They made the statement "to

announce [themselves] so people know that [they're] coming down," because

Detective Falaise did not "want to get injured, [because] people think [they're]

somebody else."

At the foot of the basement stairs is a "big room." Detective Falaise

walked through the room and through a doorway into another room, but did not

see defendant. He walked through another open doorway into a storage area or

closet and saw defendant standing against the wall. Detective Falaise told

A-5593-16T1
4
defendant to exit the storage area, and defendant complied. The detectives did

not place defendant under arrest, but they handcuffed him for their safety and

brought him upstairs. Detective Falaise testified defendant was cooperative and

never ran away, fled, impeded or intimidated the detectives or employed any

physical force or violence against them.

The vehicle was towed to the South Orange Police Department. A search

warrant was issued for the vehicle. During a subsequent search, Detective

Morillo recovered a handgun from the spare tire compartment of the trunk.

At the close of the State's case, the court dismissed the three weapons

charges. The court determined the State failed to present sufficient evidence

permitting a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

possessed the handgun that was found in the vehicle. See State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the

obstruction charge alleged in count one.

Jefferson Sr. testified as a defense witness. He explained that he permitted

the detectives to enter his home because it was "freezing outside." He asked the

detectives to remain in the foyer and never granted them permission to enter the

basement. Jefferson Sr. said he first went into the basement to look for

A-5593-16T1
5
defendant because the detectives wanted to speak with him. He told the

detectives he did not find defendant and that defendant was not home.

In her decision from the bench, the judge found defendant did not go into

the basement after the detectives entered the home. Instead, the judge found

"defendant may have heard the police and gone downstairs" before the

detectives entered the home.

The judge further found that the detectives "yell[ed]" downstairs,

"Montclair Police. Is there anyone down here?" The judge found the basement

door was open and "assum[ed]" that if the detectives and Jefferson Sr. had been

talking upstairs, that "voices carry."

The court found that it appeared defendant "would have heard some

conversation" either while he was "in the basement or prior to the . . . detectives

coming into . . . the house." The court observed that it did not know "what was

in [defendant's] mind," but found he "chose to go down [into] the basement and

chose to secrete himself in the closet." The court further found that "as soon as

the officer called [defendant], he came out."

Based on those findings, the court concluded "there is an impairment on

[defendant's] part to obstruct" the detective's effort to question him. The court

found defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of disorderly persons

A-5593-16T1
6
obstruction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. Defendant, who spent 523 days in custody

awaiting trial, was sentenced to time served and the payment of fines and

penalties. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant makes the following arguments:

Point I

The Police Officers Lacked Probable Cause To Search
Through-Out The Home Of The Appellant, Elelake
Jefferson, Jr.

Point II

The State Did Not Prove The Appellant, Elelake
Jefferson, Jr., Obstructed The Administration Of Law
Or Other Governmental Function Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt.

Our review of a judge's verdict following a bench trial is limited. State v.

Miller, 449 N.J. Super. 460, 472 (App. Div. 2017), certif. granted, 234 N.J. 1

(2018). "The standard is not whether the verdict [is] against the weight of the

evidence, but rather 'whether there is sufficient credible evidence in the record

to support the judge's determination.'" Ibid. (quoting State ex rel. R.V., 280 N.J.

Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1995)).

We defer to the judge's findings of fact "which are substantially influenced

by [the] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy," State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471

A-5593-16T1
7
(1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)), and "do not disturb

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are

convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests

of justice," Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App.

Div. 1963)). A reviewing court, however, owes no deference to the trial court

in deciding matters of law. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010).

The court found defendant guilty of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), which

provides that a person commits an offense:

if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental function or
prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from
lawfully performing an official function by means of
flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference or obstacle, or by means of any
independently unlawful act. This section does not
apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an
official duty, or any other means of avoiding
compliance with law without affirmative interference
with governmental functions.

[ N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added).]

"[N]ot just any interference with the administration of law constitutes the

criminal act of obstruction." State v. Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. 113, 118 (App.

A-5593-16T1
8 Div. 2005). "Simply obstructing, impairing or perverting the administration of

law or the governmental function" does not violate N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). Ibid.

The statute prohibits only "(1) violent or physical interference, [or] (2) other

acts which are 'unlawful' independently of the purpose to obstruct the

government." Id. at 117 (quoting Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law

Revision Commission, Vol. II, 1971, at 280). To support a conviction under

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), the State must prove that the obstruction is "carried out in

a manner described in the statute: 'by means of flight, intimidation, force,

violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently

unlawful act.'" Ibid. (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a)).

Here, there is no evidence defendant engaged in any acts of intimidation,

used force or violence, physically interfered with the detectives or committed

any independent unlawful act. To the contrary, Detective Falaise testified

defendant was cooperative and not violent, and acknowledged defendant did not

use force or violence and did not engage in any unlawful acts or acts of

intimidation. According to Detective Falaise, defendant was given a single

directive, to exit the storage area, and he immediately complied. Cf. State v.

Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 172 (2015) (upholding obstruction conviction where the

defendant attempted to close a door on officers as they entered to "perform an

A-5593-16T1
9
official function under the emergency-aid doctrine"); State v. Williams, 192 N.J.
1, 11 (2007) (holding the defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) by fleeing after

being ordered by the police "to place his hands on his head for a pat-down

search"); State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 460 (2006) (holding defendant violated

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) by fleeing after an officer ordered the defendant to stop for

questioning).

The court did not expressly identify a physical action encompassed by

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) that supports defendant's conviction. However, a fair

reading of the court's decision reflects that the court determined defendant

committed the offense by "prevent[ing] or attempt[ing] to prevent a public

servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight."

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (emphasis added). The court's verdict is based on its

limited finding that defendant "would have heard some conversation, either

[while] in the basement or prior to the . . . detectives coming . . . into the house"

and "chose to go down [in] the basement and . . . secrete himself in the closet."2

The court's findings are not supported by substantial credible evidence.

2
The court also stated "if there was nothing to flee from there would be nothing
to flee," but did not explain the relevance of this vague observation to its fact -
findings or legal conclusion that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).

A-5593-16T1
10
There is no evidence defendant "chose to go down [in] the basement" after

the detectives entered the home or after he purportedly heard Jefferson Sr.

speaking to the detectives in the foyer. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence

shows defendant was in the basement before Jefferson Sr. allowed the detectives

to enter the home. The detectives testified the basement door is located in the

hallway adjacent to the foyer where they stood speaking to Jefferson Sr., and

Detective Falaise testified defendant was not seen in the hallway going into the

basement.

The court's determination defendant committed obstruction by flight is

also based on its finding defendant "would have heard some conversation . . .

prior to the . . . detectives coming into . . . the house."3 The court's finding

defendant "would have heard" the detectives speaking outside of the home

before they entered is unsupported by any evidence. The record is bereft of

evidence the detectives had a conversation while outside defendant's home

during which anyone said defendant's name or that they were present to

administer a law or perform a government function related to defendant.

Moreover, there is no evidence defendant was present for any conversation the

3
In a similarly equivocal finding, the court stated, "I think [defendant] may
have heard the police and gone downstairs."
A-5593-16T1
11
detectives had while outside or otherwise could hear such a conversation from

the confines of his home. The lack of evidentiary support for the court's finding

defendant prevented or attempted to prevent the detectives from lawfully

performing an official function by means of purported flight into the basement

requires a reversal of his conviction. 4 See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).

The record also does not support the court's conclusion that defendant

violated N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) by remaining in the basement after the detectives

entered the home. The detectives did not have a warrant for defendant's arrest

and did no more than advise Jefferson Sr. that they wanted to speak with

defendant. Even assuming, as the court did, that defendant might have heard

the detectives tell Jefferson Sr. that they wanted to speak with him, defendant

was under no obligation to speak to the police or make himself available in his

own home to answer the detectives' questions. Under such circumstances,

defendant's decision to remain in the basement after the detectives expressed an

interest in speaking with him neither constituted flight nor any other physical

4
We do not suggest the court would have been correct in finding defendant
committed an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) if the evidence showed
defendant went into the basement in response to hearing a conversation among
detectives while they were outside of his home. We need not decide the issue
because, as noted, there is no evidence there was such a conversation, defendant
heard such a conversation or that defendant went into the basement in response
to such a conversation.
A-5593-16T1
12
action obstructing the administration of law or any other government function.

See Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. at 118 (holding the defendant did not commit the

offense of obstruction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) by refusing to supply

information required by a state trooper to complete a report). The court erred

by finding otherwise.

Defendant also argues his conviction should be reversed because he was

discovered in the basement as the result of an unlawful, warrantless search of

his home. Given our reversal of defendant's conviction on other grounds, it is

unnecessary to address the contention.

Reversed.

Order dismissed certain Minor traffic offenses more than 15 years old

Order dismissed certain Minor traffic offenses more than 15 years old
WHEREAS a review by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) has revealed that there are 787,764 unresolved complaints on minor municipal court matters dating from before January 1, 2003. In those matters, arrest warrants were issued to defendants for failure to appear, and the warrants remain open. The vast majority of those cases are from 1986 to 2003;
WHEREAS those minor outstanding matters include parking violations; motor vehicle offenses (such as going through a stop sign, improper passing, general motor vehicle equipment violations, certain speeding offenses, and running a red light); local ordinance violations; fish and game violations; and penalty enforcement actions. They do not include more serious matters, namely:
(1) Indictable charges
(2) Disorderly persons charges
(3) Petty disorderly persons charges
(4) The following motor vehicle charges:

N.J.S.A. 39:3-10 N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.13
N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.24 N.J.S.A. 39:3-10.18(b)
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1 N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.14 N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.19 N.J.S.A. 39:4-96

Driving without a license
Operating a commercial vehicle while
intoxicated
Refusal to submit to a breath test while
operating a commercial vehicle Operating a commercial vehicle while commercial license suspended or
revoked
Driving while license suspended or revoked Drugs in a motor vehicle
Driving while intoxicated
Refusal to submit to a chemical test Underage driving while intoxicated
Failure to install an interlock device Reckless driving

N.J.S.A. 39:4-98
N.J.S.A. 39:4-128.1 N.J.S.A. 39:4-129(a), (b)
N.J.S.A. 39:68-2 N.J.S.A. 12:7-46

Speeding (only those complaints in which the speed was alleged to be in excess of 35 mph over the posted speed limit)
Passing a stopped school bus Leaving the scene of an accident with
personal injury or property damage Driving without insurance
Boating while intoxicated

(5) or cases associated with a matter in any of the above categories; WHEREAS those old outstanding complaints and open warrants in minor matters
raise questions of fairness, the appropriate use of limited public resources by law enforcement and the courts, the ability of the State to prosecute cases successfully inlight of how long matters have been pending and the availability of witnesses, and administrative efficiency;
WHEREAS, after the AOC provided a list of cases eligible for dismissal to the affected municipalities and published a notice to the public and various interested organizations, pursuant to the Court's July 19, 2018 order, a panel comprised of three Assignment Judges ("panel") solicited and received public comments at three hearings about whether the identified minor municipal court complaints pending for more than fifteen years should be dismissed; and
WHEREAS the three-judge panel, upon review and consideration of the public comments provided at the hearings, issued a report to the Court recommending dismissal of the above 787,764 open matters and the development of a formal process for the annual dismissal of open municipal court matters that are more than 15 years old;
THEREFORE, in the interest of justice, and consistent with Rule 7:8-5 ("Dismissal") and the recommendation of the panel, it is ORDERED that

(a) the 787,764 open municipal matters implicated by the Court's July 19, 2018 order shall be dismissed;
(b) any associated open warrant for failure to appear shall be recalled; and
(c) any associated court-ordered driver's license suspension or revocation shall be rescinded. Any rescission of a court-ordered driver's license suspension or revocation pursuant to this Order is separate from any license restoration fee or process required by the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the panel's report shall be referred to the Supreme Court Municipal Court Practice Committee
(a) to examine whether dismissal of offenses more than ten years old should be considered and whether the types of matters eligible for dismissal should be expanded; and
(b) to develop a process for the periodic review and dismissal of open ,dated municipal court matters, which would include notice to municipal prosecutors and potential revisions to the court rules.
The provisions of this Order are effective immediately. source https://www.njcourts.gov/notices/2019/n190117b.pdf

Warrantless search here no good STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DAWN A. PARKER,

Warrantless search here no good

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

DAWN A. PARKER,

Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

Submitted October 17, 2018 â€“ Decided November 9, 2018

Before Judges Currier and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-03-0657.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5375-16T4

PER CURIAM
Defendant Dawn A. Parker appeals from a June 16, 2017 order denying

her application for admission into the Pretrial Intervention (PTI) program and a

July 28, 2017 judgment of conviction sentencing her to three years of probation

and requiring payment of restitution in the amount of $31,599.88, payable at the

rate of fifty dollars per month. We affirm.

Defendant's conviction stemmed from her involvement in stealing

insurance funds and opening a bank account. Defendant claimed her boyfriend

stole a $102,719.54 insurance check and demanded she deposit the stolen check

in a bank account. In return for participating in this plan, the boyfriend agreed

to share the stolen funds with defendant.

On November 17, 2016, defendant opened a bank account at a local branch

of Provident Bank (Bank). Defendant then deposited the stolen check into that

account. Several days later, defendant made withdrawals, totaling $31,800.00,

at different Bank locations. Suspecting fraud, the Bank froze the account.

Defendant contacted the Bank on November 29, 2016, regarding the frozen

account. The Bank advised defendant she had to appear, in person, to lift the

hold on the account. When defendant arrived at the Bank, she was arrested and

charged with one count of second-degree theft by deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-

4(a), and five counts of third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1(a)(1).

A-5375-16T4
2
After she was charged, defendant filed an application for PTI. The

prosecutor denied defendant's request for PTI, and defendant appealed to the

Superior Court. The judge upheld the prosecutor's denial of defendant's

admission to PTI. Defendant then pled guilty to two counts of forgery. She was

sentenced to three years of probation and ordered to pay $31,599.88 in

restitution, payable fifty dollars monthly.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I

THE PROSECUTOR'S REJECTION OF MS.
PARKER'S PTI APPLICATION CONSTITUTES A
PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

A. Consideration of a dismissed municipal offense and
pending misdemeanor charges in finding factors 9 and
12 violated State v. K.S.; contrary to the State's
position, these factors weigh in favor of admission.

B. Contrary to the prosecutor's letter, the [B]ank's
statement that it did not object to the defendant's entry
into PTI supported factor 4 and weighs in favor of
admission.

C. The State's recommendation of probation and the
Court's finding of sentencing mitigating factor 10
demonstrates that PTI factors 5, 6, 14, and 17 all
support Ms. Parker's application.

D. Full and proper consideration of Ms. Parker's
application demonstrates compelling reasons to

A-5375-16T4
3
overcome the presumption against admission and that
denial of entry subverts the goals of PTI.

POINT II

THE RESTITUTION ORDER REQUIRING MS.
PARKER TO PAY $31,599. 88 FOR 52 YEARS AND
8 MONTHS IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.

POINT III

RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE
COURT INCORRECTLY REJECTED MITIGATING
FACTOR 4 AND FAILED TO PROVIDE A
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR FINDING
AGGRAVATING FACTOR 3.

Our scope of review of a PTI denial is "severely limited." State v. Negran,

178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003). We afford significant deference to a prosecutor's

decision regarding PTI. State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 589 (1996). A

"[d]efendant generally has a heavy burden when seeking to overcome a

prosecutorial denial of his [or her] admission into PTI." State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008). The decision whether to admit a defendant to a PTI

program is "'primarily individualistic in nature' and a prosecutor must consider

an individual defendant's features that bear on his or her amenability to

rehabilitation." State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 255 (1995) (quoting State v.

Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 119 (1979)).

A-5375-16T4
4
To overturn a prosecutor's rejection of an application for PTI, a defendant

must "clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision

constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion." State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J.

Super. 207, 213 (App. Div. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). An abuse of

prosecutorial discretion is established when a defendant demonstrates

that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a
consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon
a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or
(c) amounted to a clear error in judgment[.] In order
for such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of
'patent and gross,' it must further be shown that the
prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert
the goals underlying [PTI].

[State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 625 (2015).]

Having reviewed the record, the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI

application did not constitute a patent and gross abuse of discretion. We review

each of the applicable factors regarding defendant's PTI request.

We first consider factor nine, "[t]he applicant's record of criminal and

penal violations and the extent to which she may present a substantial danger to

others," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(9), and factor twelve, "[t]he history of the use of

physical violence towards others." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(12). These factors

examine a defendant's prior dismissed charges and arrests. Our Supreme Court

has held the "[u]se of prior dismissed charges alone as evidence of a history of

A-5375-16T4
5
and propensity for violence or a pattern of anti-social behavior, where

defendant's culpability or other facts germane to admission into [PTI] have not

been established in some way, constitutes an impermissible inference of guilt."

State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190, 202 (2015).

Here, defendant was previously arrested for simple assault in connection

with a domestic violence incident, and the charge was dismissed. That

dismissed charge was not considered in evaluating defendant's admission in PTI.

However, after her arrest in this case, defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania

and charged with "Terroristic Threats and Use or Possession of an Electrical

Incapacitating Device." The prosecutor relied on the pending Pennsylvania

arrest to determine defendant has a propensity toward violence, satisfying

factors nine and twelve. The PTI judge upheld the determination, finding "the

State is not referencing the prior dismissals, but rather the pending Pennsylvania

matter. So it's a permissible reference under K.S."

Next is factor four, "[t]he desire of the complainant or the victim to forego

prosecution," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(4). Defendant argues the Bank did not

oppose her entry into PTI. However, the Bank did not oppose PTI conditioned

on defendant's payment of restitution in the full amount. The Bank even

suggested the imposition of restitution in "[sixty] equal payments of $526.66."

A-5375-16T4
6
In rejecting factor four, the prosecutor determined, "the branch manager

at the . . . Bank has continued to cooperate with the State in its prosecution of

the case." The prosecutor deemed the "continued cooperation" on the part of

the Bank was not a statement "to forego prosecution." The judge upheld the

State's determination on this factor, finding this matter was "not a private dispute

between [the Bank] and defendant." The judge concluded preserving the

"integrity of the financial system" for the benefit of the general public was

paramount.

Factor five is the existence of personal problems and character traits which

may be addressed through services provided by supervisory treatment, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-12(e)(5), and factor six is the likelihood that the applicant's crime is

related to a situation that could be conducive to change through supervisory

treatment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 (6). In arguing the prosecutor should have

considered factors five and six, defendant asserts a probationary sentence is

functionally the same as PTI. Since the State recommended a probationary

sentence, defendant claims the State should have granted defendant's PTI

application. Defendant contends, "[i]t is incongruous that in the probationary

context, the defendant possesses sufficient potential for rehabilitation, but that

she somehow lacks the potential to succeed in PTI."

A-5375-16T4
7
Defendant's assertion that a probationary sentence and PTI are equivalent

is flawed. While probation and PTI involve supervision and rehabilitation of a

defendant, a probationary sentence results in a conviction. Consequently, the

violation of a probationary sentence carries more serious consequences than a

violation of PTI. Thus, a probationary sentence presents a stronger deterrent

effect against future criminal conduct than PTI.

Defendant also asserts the prosecutor "completely failed to consider any

of the factors concerning [defendant's] amenability to supervisory treatment ,"

we disagree. The prosecutor expressly considered factor fourteen, "[w]hether

or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would

be outweighed by the public need for prosecution," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(14),

and factor seventeen, "[w]hether or not the harm done to society by abandoning

criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an

offender into a supervisory treatment program," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(17).

In considering factors fourteen and seventeen, the prosecutor determined

there was a "strong need for deterrence" in this case, which would not "be

accomplished by admitting the defendant into a minimally supervised short-term

program and then dismissing her case." The PTI judge found the prosecutor's

determination was "particularly within the purview of the State," and chose to

A-5375-16T4
8
not disturb this finding. Regarding factor seventeen, the judge again deferred to

the prosecutor, stating the harm to society in abandoning prosecution of

detention for this serious crime did not outweigh the benefits to society from

"channeling an offender into supervisory treatment." In this case, defendant

will receive supervisory treatment, but it will be through probation rather than

PTI.

Based on the foregoing, the PTI judge concluded the prosecutor

considered all of the relevant factors in rejecting defendant's PTI application and

found the denial of PTI was not a patent and gross abuse of discretion.

In reviewing a denial of PTI, we note there is a presumption of

incarceration for second-degree offenders, which may not be overcome except

in "'truly extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances' . . . [where] 'a serious

injustice' exists." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 252 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,

358 (1984)). A defendant may rebut the presumption by "showing compelling

reasons justifying the applicant's admission and establishing that a decision

against enrollment would be arbitrary and unreasonable." Guidelines for

Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New Jersey, Pressler & Verniero, Current

N.J. Court Rules, Guideline 3(i)(4) to R. 3:28 (2018). If a defendant "fails to

A-5375-16T4
9
rebut the presumption against diversion," then "[r]ejection based solely on the

nature of the offense is appropriate." State v. Caliguiri, 158 N.J. 28, 43 (1999).

Because defendant was charged with second-degree theft by deception,

she offers the following "compelling reasons" to overcome the presumption of

incarceration. Specifically, defendant states she is a single mother with a young

child, she has no prior record, and the stigma of a criminal record will prevent

her from working as a security guard. These reasons do not constitute "truly

extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances" of "a serious injustice." Nwobu,

139 N.J. at 252.

Contrary to defendant's argument, she has a prior record. Defendant was

arrested and charged in Pennsylvania with a violent crime, involving a stun gun.

Moreover, defendant worked as a security guard for one month, but has a two

year college background and certification in medical billing and coding,

affording her other job options. Further, many defendants are single parents

raising children. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the prosecutor

considered defendant's personal circumstances and determined defendant failed

to overcome the presumption against admission to PTI given the nature of the

offense in this case.

A-5375-16T4
10
We next review defendant's argument that restitution, imposed as part of

the judgment of conviction, is manifestly excessive. Pursuant to N.J.S.A.

2C:44-2(c)(2), in setting restitution, a court "shall take into account all financial

resources of the defendant, including the defendant's likely future earnings, and

shall set the amount of restitution so as to provide the victim with the fullest

compensation for loss that is consistent with the defendant's ability to pay." A

defendant will be required to pay restitution if: "(1) the victim . . . suffered a

loss; and (2) [t]he defendant is able to pay or, given a fair opportunity, will be

able to pay restitution." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b).

Here, prior to the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel advised

defendant was willing to pay the full restitution amount of $31,599.88 in

monthly installments of fifty dollars. The trial judge acknowledged he had the

discretion to limit the installment amount, but declined to do so because he was

"somewhat optimistic in [defendant's] prospects," and set the payment of

restitution at fifty dollars per month. The judge did so because defendant, in her

plea agreement and during the sentencing hearing, indicated she was able to pay

that amount. The judge also required periodic reviews of defendant's ability to

pay, allowing for the monthly payment to be modified if defendant's ability to

pay changed in the future.

A-5375-16T4
11
We discern no basis to disturb the amount defendant is required to pay

toward restitution. The sum is the amount defendant and her counsel stated she

was able to pay. Given defendant's two years of college and training in medical

coding and billing, defendant has the ability to fund the agreed upon monthly

restitution payment.

We next consider defendant's argument regarding the sentencing judge's

application of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Defendant contends

mitigating factor four was improperly rejected by the judge, and the judge's

finding of aggravating factor three lacked a requisite statement of reasons.

Our review of a sentencing decision is "narrow" and "governed by an

abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010). We

may modify a defendant's sentence if the judge was "clearly mistaken." State v.

L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 107 (App. Div. 2009) (internal citation omitted).

Courts must consider aggravating and mitigating factors so long as they are

supported by credible evidence. Id. at 108.

Mitigating factor four provides, "[t]here were substantial grounds tending

to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a

defense." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4). As a domestic violence survivor, defendant

argues her conduct should be excused because she believed participating in this

A-5375-16T4
12
crime would free her, emotionally and financially, from her abusive boyfriend.

The judge disagreed, determining, "[a] desire to become financially independent

is not a mitigation . . . [it] is a motive to commit a financial crime, which

happened here."

There is not enough evidence in the record for us to conclude the judge

should have applied mitigating factor four. Defendant claims her boyfriend

pressured her to participate in this crime. However, the only evidence submitted

in support of her claim is defendant's own statement, which is insufficient to

find the judge abused his discretion or was "clearly mistaken." L.V., 410 N.J.

Super. at 107.

A trial judge must provide reasons for imposing a particular sentence. See

State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014) (holding in order to "facilitate meaningful

appellate review, trial judges must explain how they arrived at a particular

sentence."); State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 74 (2014) ("the court must 'state

reasons for imposing [a] sentence[.]'") (quoting R. 3:21-4(g)). However, a

sentence will be upheld if it is "possible in the context of [the] record to

extrapolate without great difficulty the court's reasoning . . . [and] does not

shock the judicial conscience." State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 566 (1989).

A-5375-16T4
13
Defendant asserts the judge failed to provide a statement of reasons for

applying aggravating factor three. In applying aggravating factor three, the trial

judge determined, "I find aggravating factor[ ] [three] . . . need to deter a risk of

future criminality . . . there is a need for specific deterrence here, and there

certainly is a general deterrence factor that applies."

Based on the record, we can "extrapolate without great difficulty," the

judge's reasoning regarding application of aggravating factor three. This case

presented a sophisticated crime, involving a significant sum of money, that was

well-planned between defendant and her boyfriend over the course of many

weeks. It was not a stretch for the judge to find a need to deter such crimes in

the future because of the carefully considered and deliberate nature of

defendant's criminal conduct. The application of this aggravating factor, based

on this record, does not shock our judicial conscience.

Affirmed.

Thursday, May 2, 2019

Spring 2019 NJ Municipal Court Law Review

Spring 2019 NJ Municipal Court Law Review

Index

1. Police can’t detain occupants on noise complaint State v Chisum

2. Guilty finding vacated based on state failure to provide evidenceState v. Brown

3. Refusal to let police into home is not criminal interference State v. Fede

4 Miranda violated here where detectives failed to advise subject of charges State v. Vincenty

5. Chief Justice Orders Special Master in the DWI cases involving the trooper who did not conduct correct tests.State v. Cassidy

6. Company & lawyer can’t use criminal prosecution for civil benefit In the Matter of Helmer

7. Drug court grads entitled to presumption of expungement IMO the Expungement of the Arrest/Charge Records of T.B

8. Annual Jersey Shore Happy Hour & Networking Social

July 12, 2019

9. Photos

Handling Drug, DWI and Serious Cases in Municipal Court Seminar p1

Photo NJSBA President John Keefe Jr. and Ken V at NJ Bar meeting Rome p2

Bob Carlson ABA president at ABA meeting Las Vegas p3

Judy Perry Martinez ABA President Elect at ABA meeting Las Vegas p3

Jack Canfield Best selling author Chicken Soup for Soul and Ken Vercammen ABA Author at Charleston Leadership conference p4

1. Police can’t detain occupants on noise complaint State v Chisum

Once the renter of the motel room lowered the volume of the music and the police declined to issue summonses, the police no longer had any reasonable suspicion that would justify the continued detention of the room’s occupants. Once the noise was abated, the police no longer had an independent basis to detain the occupants, or a basis to run warrant checks on them. Such action was unlawful. And because the detention and warrant checks were unlawful, the subsequent pat down of Woodard was also improper. The judgment of the Appellate Division is therefore reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for the withdrawal of defendants’ guilty pleas and further proceedings. (A-35-17/A-36-17; 079823/079835)

2. Guilty finding vacated based on state failure to provide evidenceState v. Brown

The State’s failure to produce nineteen discovery items until one week after the beginning of defendants’ murder trial did violate defendants’ due process rights under Brady. The Court reaches this conclusion, in part, because the trial court abused its discretion by excluding admissible impeachment and exculpatory evidence withheld by the State. Though there is no evidence or allegation that the State acted in bad faith or intentionally in failing to timely produce the discoverable material, the Court nonetheless vacates defendants’ convictions and remands for a new trial because defendants were deprived of a fair trial. A-23-17/A-24-17; 079553/079556)

3. Refusal to let police into home is not criminal interference State v. Fede

The Court stresses that the police officers had the right to enter defendant’s home under the emergency-aid doctrine, which permits warrantless entry under circumstances like those presented in this case. Because defendant’s refusal to remove the door chain did not constitute an affirmative interference for purposes of obstructing justice within the meaning of the obstruction statute, the Court reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division and vacates defendant’s conviction. (A-53-17)

4 Miranda violated here where detectives failed to advise subject of charges State v. Vincenty__ NJ __ (2019)

The record reveals that the detectives failed to inform Vincenty of the charges filed against him when they read him his rights and asked him to waive his right against self-incrimination. That failure deprived Vincenty of the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his right against self-incrimination. Pursuant to A.G.D., Vincenty’s motion to suppress should have been granted. (A-40-17;

5. Chief Justice Orders Special Master in the DWI cases involving the trooper who did not conduct correct tests.State v. Cassidy

WHEREAS the Court in State v. Cassidy(A-58-16) issued a decision on November 13, 2018 holding that Alcotest results from machines calibrated without using a thermometer that produces NIST-traceable temperature readings in the calibration process are inadmissible as evidence; and

WHEREAS the Administrative Office of the Courts previously had been notified by the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General that evidential breath samples from defendants in 20,667 driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases were procured using Alcotest machines calibrated without using a NIST-traceable thermometer and over 1 3,000 of those cases involved findings of guilty, either by trial or by plea;

……..IT IS ORDERED pursuant to N.J. Const. (1947) Art. 6, S 2, 3, that, effective immediately and until further order, Superior Court Judge Robert A. Fall, retired and serving on recall, in addition to any other judicial assignment on recall, is hereby designated as the special master with judicial authority on a statewide basis to make judicial and administrative decisions relating to adjudicated cases in which evidential breath samples were procured using Alcotest machines calibrated without using a NIST-traceable thermometer; and

…….. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this designation of Judge Fall as special master shall last until further order, with Judge Fall being asked to report to the Court as soon as practicable, and regularly thereafter, on the issue of whether statewide management of the subject issues remains beneficial and in the public interest or whether the cases would be better managed at the vicinage and/or municipal level.

6. Lawyer can’t use criminal prosecution for civil benefit In the Matter of Helmer

RPC 3.4(g) provides that “a lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in a civil matter.” The Complaint asserted multiple grounds for the charged violation including Helmer’s entering into a retainer arrangement in which his fee was partly contingent upon payment of restitution; his meeting with Branco, Walters, Matlock, and NFI’s general counsel to press for a criminal prosecution after a declination; Helmer’s participation in drafting the indictment; his testimony before the grand jury; and his influencing Branco and Walters to seek high bail, have the indictment sealed, and arrest Land and Pessiki during a civil mediation session.

RPC 8.4(a) provides that “it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.” RPC 8.4(d) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The Complaint asserted that Helmer’s “actions to collect money utilizing the criminal process on behalf of NFI . . . would have impacted the administration of justice in the criminal, civil and bankruptcy cases.”

Victims can pursue restitution in both the civil and criminal arenas. One challenge practitioners face is to refrain from presenting or threatening “to present criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in a civil matter.” RPC 3.4(g). Heightened care is needed to navigate potential pitfalls in that area. In this case, though, the core issue is not whether private counsel could pursue restitution through the criminal process but rather the manner in which he sought to do so. Helmer’s conduct here pushed the envelope. Although he actively encouraged a criminal prosecution and advocated for restitution for his client, to place primary responsibility on Helmer for what occurred overlooks the role and decision-making authority of the prosecution team.

The burden of proof in disciplinary matters is clear and convincing evidence. R. 2:15- 15(a). In addition, when a violation of RPC 8.4(d) is the sole basis for discipline, a particularly high level of proof is required. The proceedings in this matter did not follow best practices and were troubling in a number of respects. Nonetheless, the Court did not find clear and convincing evidence that Helmer’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(d).

7. Drug court grads entitled to presumption of expungement

IMO the Expungement of the Arrest/Charge Records of T.B

The plain language of the 2016 drug court expungement statute requires judges to determine whether expungement would be consistent with the public interest. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-14(m)(2); id. § 52-2(c)(3). Successful graduates who have committed certain offenses and apply for expungement are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that expungement is consistent with the public interest. (A-18/19/

8. Annual Jersey Shore Happy Hour & Networking Social

July 12, 2019

Professionals, Attorneys, Law Enforcement invited to Happy Hour & Networking Social. Free for all

at Bar Anticipation 703 16th Ave. Lake Como/ Belmar, NJ 07719

5:30-7:55PM Hot & Cold Buffet

The reduced price Happy Hour is 6-7PM is $2.00 House Drinks, House Wine Bud/BudLt draft. Co-sponsored by NJ State Bar Association Municipal Court Section, Retired Police Middlesex Monmouth Local 9 & several other organizations

Outdoor & Indoor music, prize giveaways. Bring your friends. Pass this along. Please bring a canned food donation for a community food bank, continuing to provide food and help to individuals in need.

Email Ken Vercammen's Law Office so we can put your name on the VIP list for wristbands. VercammenLaw@Njlaws.com

If your group, non-profit or organization wishes to co-sponsor the networking happy hour, please contact KENNETH VERCAMMEN, Esq.

Free Office Space for Transitional or New Attorney and work with Metuchen Public Defender and go to Court & Mentor program- Edison, NJ

Help handle Wednesday night 5:15 -7:55pm Metuchen Municipal Court matters and two Friday mornings per month.

Attorney will be provided with use of desk, plus if needed additional private office space in furnished basement to start their practice, rent-free. They can see clients in first floor office rooms. In return they will handle municipal court appearances, Telephone communications with courts, prosecutors, clients, etc, Will signings and other legal work and criminal law website updates in lieu of rent for maximum 5 hours per week.

-Call Courts to follow up on Letter of Representation and scheduling of hearings & call Police Departments to follow up on discovery

- Prepare timesheets on Fatal Accident cases

-Call clients and remind them of hearing dates and what to do

- Update Criminal and Civil blogs with recent cases

-Assist at Senior citizen Will Seminars and Municipal Court programs

Go to court and get court experience. Excellent opportunity to jump-start your career. You will get to represent people in Municipal Courts in Middlesex, Union and Monmouth County and meet the top Prosecutors and Judges. Must be admitted in NJ and have a car.

https://www.njlaws.com/office_space.html

Learn to interview potential Municipal Court/Criminal clients. Also learn to draft Wills and work on Litigation files. Attorney may also help provide legal assistance to members of prepaid legal plans and public defender clients. Follow up contact calls with clients, courts, prosecutors and bar associations.

Excellent mentoring position for the right attorney. Are you hardworking and aggressive? Visit our website: www.njlaws.comto learn about our office. More details at www.njlaws.com/lease.htm

If interested, fax, mail , fax or email a resume and cover letter.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, Esq. Metuchen Public Defender

2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500

(Fax) 732-572-0030 vercammenlaw@njlaws.com

__________________________________________

The following is included with office use:

Desk space

Reception room for clients and use as Bona Fide Office

You can copy and use our Complaints, Motions, Form Letters and Pleadings.

Use our marketing books, marketing CDs, Criminal, Municipal Court and Elder law audiotapes and video library now located in basement

Use of our computer forms Motions, Complaints, and Form letters

Ability to use a file cabinet in basement to store your old files

Lighting/ Utilities

Bathroom Supplies

Landscaping / Snow Removal

Valuable advice

Hot water, municipal water/sewer charge paid

Other Duties/ Services to Clients

- Help add our 900+ criminal articles and statutes to our new criminal articles blog [We will teach you how to add articles to Blogs]

-Prepare Police Chief letters

- Whatever else needed to assist clients [ex Motions, ]

N.J. Municipal Court - Law Review SUBSCRIPTION INFO

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2053 Woodbridge Ave.

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732-572-0500

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. Municipal Court and criminal law attorneys may also be interested in the ABA’s CRIMINAL LAW FORMSbook

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Use Criminal Law Formsto help represent persons charged with criminal and traffic offenses. Detailed instruction and valuable insight is offered beginning with the initial contact with the client, to walking into the courthouse, and managing the steps that follow. Two hundred and ten modifiable forms help make criminal lawyers more efficient and productive, while also reducing the chance for mistakes. Criminal Law Formshelps lawyers face the challenges of:

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Kenneth Vercammenis an Edison, Middlesex County, NJ trial attorney where he handles Criminal, Municipal Court, Probate, Civil Litigation and Estate Administration matters. Ken is author of the American Bar Association's award winning book “Criminal Law Forms” and often lectures to trial lawyers of the American Bar Association, NJ State Bar Association and Middlesex County Bar Association. As the Past Chair of the Municipal Court Section he has served on its board for 10 years.

Awarded the Municipal Court Attorney of the Year by both the NJSBA and Middlesex County Bar Association, he also received the NJSBA- YLD Service to the Bar Award and the General Practitioner Attorney of the Year, now Solo Attorney of the Year.

Ken Vercammen is a highly regarded lecturer on both Municipal Court/ DWI and Estate/ Probate Law issues for the NJICLE- New Jersey State Bar Association, American Bar Association, and Middlesex County Bar Association. His articles have been published by NJ Law Journal, ABA Law Practice Management Magazine, YLD Dictum, GP Gazette and New Jersey Lawyer magazine. He was a speaker at the 2013 ABA Annual meeting program “Handling the Criminal Misdemeanor and Traffic Case” and serves as is the Editor in Chief of the NJ Municipal Court Law Review.

For nine years he served as the Cranbury Township Prosecutor and also was a Special Acting Prosecutor in nine different towns. Ken has successfully handled over one thousand Municipal Court and Superior Court matters in the past 27 years.

His private practice has devoted a substantial portion of professional time to the preparation and trial of litigated matters. Appearing in Courts throughout New Jersey several times each week on Criminal and Municipal Court trials, civil and contested Probate hearings. Ken also serves as the Editor of the popular legal website and related blogs. In Law School he was a member of the Law Review, winner of the ATLA trial competition and top ten in class.

Throughout his career he has served the NJSBA in many leadership and volunteer positions. Ken has testified for the NJSBA before the Senate Judiciary Committee to support changes in the DWI law to permit restricted use driver license and interlock legislation. Ken also testified before the Assembly Judiciary Committee in favor of the first-time criminal offender “Conditional Dismissal” legislation which permits dismissal of some criminal charges. He is the voice of the Solo and Small firm attorneys who juggle active court practice with bar and community activities. In his private life he has been a member of the NJ State champion Raritan Valley Road Runners master’s team and is a 4^thdegree black belt.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2053 Woodbridge Ave.

Edison, NJ 08817

(Phone) 732-572-0500