2C :35-2 Definitions.

2C :35-2  Definitions.

   2C :35-2 .  As used in this chapter:

   "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or research subject by: (1) a practitioner (or, in his presence, by his lawfully authorized agent), or (2) the patient or research subject at the lawful direction and in the presence of the practitioner.

   "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser but does not include a common or contract carrier, public warehouseman, or employee thereof.

   "Controlled dangerous substance" means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V, any substance the distribution of which is specifically prohibited in N.J.S.2C:35-3, in section 3 of P.L.1997, c.194 (C.2C:35-5.2), in section 5 of P.L.1997, c.194 (C.2C:35-5.3), in section 2 of P.L.2011, c.120 (C.2C:35-5.3a), or in section 2 of P.L.2013, c.35 (C.2C:35-5.3b), and any drug or substance which, when ingested, is metabolized or otherwise becomes a controlled dangerous substance in the human body. When any statute refers to controlled dangerous substances, or to a specific controlled dangerous substance, it shall also be deemed to refer to any drug or substance which, when ingested, is metabolized or otherwise becomes a controlled dangerous substance or the specific controlled dangerous substance, and to any substance that is an immediate precursor of a controlled dangerous substance or the specific controlled dangerous substance. The term shall not include distilled spirits, wine, malt beverages, as those terms are defined or used in R.S.33:1-1 et seq., or tobacco and tobacco products. The term, wherever it appears in any law or administrative regulation of this State, shall include controlled substance analogs.

   "Controlled substance analog" means a substance that has a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled dangerous substance and that was specifically designed to produce an effect substantially similar to that of a controlled dangerous substance.  The term shall not include a substance manufactured or distributed in conformance with the provisions of an approved new drug application or an exemption for investigational use within the meaning of section 505 of the "Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act," 52 Stat. 1052 (21 U.S.C. s.355).

   "Counterfeit substance" means a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, number, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of, or to have been distributed by, such other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.

   "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, whether or not there is an agency relationship.

   "Dispense" means to deliver a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery. "Dispenser" means a practitioner who dispenses.

   "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.  "Distributor" means a person who distributes.

   "Drugs" means (a) substances recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (b) substances intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (c) substances (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (d) substances intended for use as a component of any article specified in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section; but does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories.

   "Drug or alcohol dependent person" means a person who as a result of using a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog or alcohol has been in a state of psychic or physical dependence, or both, arising from the use of that controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog or alcohol on a continuous or repetitive basis. Drug or alcohol dependence is characterized by behavioral and other responses, including but not limited to a strong compulsion to take the substance on a recurring basis in order to experience its psychic effects, or to avoid the discomfort of its absence.

   "Hashish" means the resin extracted from any part of the plant Genus Cannabis L. and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such resin.  "Hashish" shall not mean hemp or a hemp product cultivated, handled, processed, transported, or sold pursuant to the "New Jersey Hemp Farming Act," P.L.2019, c.238 (C.4:28-6 et al.).

   "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, either directly or by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container, except that this term does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog by an individual for his own use or the preparation, compounding, packaging, or labeling of a controlled dangerous substance:  (1) by a practitioner as an incident to his administering or dispensing of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog in the course of his professional practice, or (2) by a practitioner (or under his supervision) for the purpose of, or as an incident to, research, teaching, or chemical analysis and not for sale.

   "Marijuana" means all parts of the plant Genus Cannabis L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof, and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds, except those containing resin extracted from the plant; but shall not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil, or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of mature stalks, fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of germination.  "Marijuana" shall not mean hemp or a hemp product cultivated, handled, processed, transported, or sold pursuant to the "New Jersey Hemp Farming Act," P.L.2019, c.238 (C.4:28-6 et al.).

   "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:

   (a)   Opium, coca leaves, and opiates;

   (b)   A compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates;

   (c)   A substance (and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation thereof) which is chemically identical with any of the substances referred to in subsections (a) and (b), except that the words "narcotic drug" as used in this act shall not include decocainized coca leaves or extracts of coca leaves, which extracts do not contain cocaine or ecogine.

   "Opiate" means any dangerous substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having such addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability.  It does not include, unless specifically designated as controlled pursuant to the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-3), the dextrorotatory isomer of 3-methoxy-n-methylmorphinan and its salts (dextromethorphan).  It does include its racemic and levorotatory forms.

   "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species Papaver somniferum L., except the seeds thereof.

   "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, other institution or entity, or one or more individuals.

   "Plant" means an organism having leaves and a readily observable root formation, including, but not limited to, a cutting having roots, a rootball or root hairs.

   "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing.

   "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, laboratory, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, or administer a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog in the course of professional practice or research in this State.

   (a)   "Physician" means a physician authorized by law to practice medicine in this or any other state and any other person authorized by law to treat sick and injured human beings in this or any other state.

   (b)   "Veterinarian" means a veterinarian authorized by law to practice veterinary medicine in this State.

   (c)   "Dentist" means a dentist authorized by law to practice dentistry in this State.

   (d)   "Hospital" means any federal institution, or any institution for the care and treatment of the sick and injured, operated or approved by the appropriate State department as proper to be entrusted with the custody and professional use of controlled dangerous substances or controlled substance analogs.

   (e)   "Laboratory" means a laboratory to be entrusted with the custody of narcotic drugs and the use of controlled dangerous substances or controlled substance analogs for scientific, experimental, and medical purposes and for purposes of instruction approved by the Department of Health.

   "Production" includes the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.

   "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Division of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Law and Public Safety has found to be and by regulation designates as being the principal compound commonly used or produced primarily for use, and which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit such manufacture.

   "Residential treatment facility" means any facility licensed and approved by the Department of Human Services and which is approved by any county probation department for the inpatient treatment and rehabilitation of drug or alcohol dependent persons.

   "Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V" are the schedules set forth in sections 5 through 8 of P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-5 through 24:21-8) and in section 4 of P.L.1971, c.3 (C.24:21-8.1) and as modified by any regulations issued by the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs in the Department of Law and Public Safety pursuant to the director's authority as provided in section 3 of P.L.1970, c.226 (C.24:21-3).

   "State" means the State of New Jersey.

   "Ultimate user" means a person who lawfully possesses a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog for his own use or for the use of a member of his household or for administration to an animal owned by him or by a member of his household.

   "Prescription legend drug" means any drug which under federal or State law requires dispensing by prescription or order of a licensed physician, veterinarian, or dentist and is required to bear the statement "Rx only" or similar wording indicating that such drug may be sold or dispensed only upon the prescription of a licensed medical practitioner and is not a controlled dangerous substance or stramonium preparation.

   "Stramonium preparation" means a substance prepared from any part of the stramonium plant in the form of a powder, pipe mixture, cigarette, or any other form with or without other ingredients.

   "Stramonium plant" means the plant Datura Stramonium Linne, including Datura Tatula Linne.

   amended 1997, c.186, s.1; 1999, c.90, s.1; 1999, c.186; 1999, c.376, s.1; 2005, c.205, s.1; 2011, c.120, s.1; 2012, c.17, s.2; 2013, c.35, s.1; 2018, c.139, s.6; 2019, c.238, s.10.

2C :29-9 Contempt.

2C :29-9  Contempt.

   2C :29-9 . Contempt. a. A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly disobeys a judicial order or protective order, pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1985, c.250 (C.2C:28-5.1), or hinders, obstructs, or impedes the effectuation of a judicial order or the exercise of jurisdiction over any person, thing, or controversy by a court, administrative body, or investigative entity.

   b. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

   Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8), and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) or substantially similar orders entered under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this paragraph.

   (2)   In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

   Orders entered pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (8), and (9) of subsection b. of section 13 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-29) or substantially similar orders entered under the laws of another state or the United States shall be excluded from the provisions of this paragraph.

   c.   A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of section 3 of P.L.1996, c.39 (C.2C:12-10.1) or section 2 of P.L.1999, c.47 (C.2C:12-10.2) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

   d. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if that person purposely or knowingly violates any provision in an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States when the conduct which constitutes the violation could also constitute a crime or a disorderly persons offense.

   (2)   In all other cases a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense if that person purposely or knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

   e.   A person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely or knowingly violates any provision of an order entered under the provisions of the "Extreme Risk Protective Order Act of 2018," P.L.2018, c.35 (C.2C:58-20 et al.) or an order entered under the provisions of a substantially similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States.

   As used in this section, "state" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or Alaskan native village, which is recognized by a federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.

   (added)1981, c.290, s.34; amended 1987, c.356, s.9; 1988, c.28, s.3; 1991, c.261, s.18; 2005, c.333; 2008, c.81, s.3; 2015, c.141; 2015, c.147, s.10;  2016, c.93, s.3; 2018, c.35, s.12.

2C :21-43 Sale of certain alarm business signs, decals; prohibited.

2C :21-43  Sale of certain alarm business signs, decals; prohibited.

   1. a.  For the purposes of this section, "alarm business" means a partnership, corporation, or other business entity engaged in the installation, servicing, sale, or maintenance of burglar or fire alarm systems, or the monitoring of or responding to alarm signals when provided in conjunction with the burglar or fire alarm system.

   b.   A person who knowingly sells, offers, or exposes for sale, or otherwise transfers, or possesses with the intent to sell, offer, or expose for sale, a sign or decal with the name or logo that is the trademark of an alarm business without the express written consent of the alarm business commits a disorderly persons offense.

   c.   Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on any news media that accept or publish advertising that may otherwise be subject to the provisions of this section.

   L.2018, c.146, s.1.

 

2C:18-6 Degree of crime; penalties; restitution; liability to owner of property.

2C:18-6 Degree of crime; penalties; restitution; liability to owner of property.

   3. a. An offense pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1983, c.522 (C.2C:18-5) is a crime of the third degree if the actor causes pecuniary loss of $2,000 or more; a crime of the fourth degree if the actor causes pecuniary loss of more than $500 but less than $2,000; and a disorderly persons offense if the actor causes pecuniary loss of $500 or less.

   b.   The provisions of N.J.S.2C:43-3 to the contrary notwithstanding, in addition to any other sentence which the court may impose pursuant to subsection c. of this section or any other provision of law, a person convicted of an offense under P.L.1983, c.522 (C.2C:18-4 et seq.) shall be sentenced to make restitution, and to pay a fine of not less than $500 if the offense is a crime of the third degree; to pay a fine of not less than $200 if the offense is a crime of the fourth degree; and to pay a fine of not less than $100 when the conviction is of a disorderly persons offense.

   c.   A person who is convicted of an offense pursuant to section 2 of P.L.1983, c.522 (C.2C:18-5), in addition to any other fine, penalty, or restitution which may be imposed by law, shall be liable to the owner, occupant, lessee, or licensee of the lands or of the tangible property for any reasonable and necessary expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred by the owner, occupant, lessee, or licensee to ensure that the lands or the tangible property are restored to their condition prior to commission of the offense. The court shall order the defendant to pay as appropriate the amount of expenses incurred pursuant to this subsection, unless the amount cannot be ascertained or is subject to dispute in a manner that cannot be resolved without an evidentiary hearing, in which case the amount shall be determined in an action brought pursuant to R.S.4:17-2 .

   L.1983, c.522, s.3; amended 2018, c.121, s.2.

2C :18-5 Offense to trespass, damage property.

2C :18-5  Offense to trespass, damage property.

2.   It is an offense under P.L.1983, c.522 (C.2C:18-4 et seq.) to:

   a.   Knowingly or recklessly operate a motorized vehicle or to ride horseback upon the lands of another without obtaining and in possession of the written permission of the owner, occupant, lessee, or licensee thereof.

   b.   Knowingly or recklessly damage or injure any tangible property, including, but not limited to, any fence, building, feedstocks, crops, live trees, or any domestic animals, located on the lands of another.

   L.1983, c.522, s.2; amended 2018, c.121, s.1.

2C :14-13 Short title.

2C :14-13  Short title.

   1.   P.L.2015, c.147 (C.2C:14-13 et al.) shall be known and may be cited as the "Sexual Assault Survivor Protection Act of 2015."

   L.2015, c.147, s.1.

2C :13-5 Criminal coercion.

2C :13-5  Criminal coercion. 

  a.   Offense defined.  A person is guilty of criminal coercion if, with purpose unlawfully to restrict another's freedom of action to engage or refrain from engaging in conduct, he threatens to:

   (1)   Inflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other offense, regardless of the immediacy of the threat;

   (2)   Accuse anyone of an offense;

   (3)   Expose any secret which would tend to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute;

   (4)   Take or withhold action as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action;

   (5)   Bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action, except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the restriction compelled is demanded in the course of negotiation for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor acts;

   (6)   Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or

   (7)   Perform any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit the actor but which is calculated to substantially harm another person with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

   It is an affirmative defense to prosecution based on paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) that the actor believed the accusation or secret to be true or the proposed official action justified and that his purpose was limited to compelling the other to behave in a way reasonably related to the circumstances which were the subject of the accusation, exposure or proposed official action, as by desisting from further misbehavior, making good a wrong done, or refraining from taking any action or responsibility for which the actor believes the other disqualified.

   b.   Grading. Criminal coercion is a crime of the fourth degree unless the threat is to commit a crime more serious than one of the fourth degree or the actor's purpose is criminal, in which cases the offense is a crime of the third degree.

   amended 2015, c.98, s.3.

2C :12-1 Assault. 2C :12-1 . Assault. a. Simple assault. A person is guilty of assault if the person:

2C :12-1  Assault.    2C :12-1 . Assault. a. Simple assault.  A person is guilty of assault if the person:  

   (1)   Attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or

   (2)   Negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

   (3)   Attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. 

   Simple assault is a disorderly persons offense unless committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty disorderly persons offense.

   b.   Aggravated assault.  A person is guilty of aggravated assault if the person:

   (1)   Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes injury purposely or knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such injury; or

   (2)   Attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

   (3)   Recklessly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or

   (4)   Knowingly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life points a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of another, whether or not the actor believes it to be loaded; or

   (5)   Commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of this section upon:

   (a)   Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of authority or because of the officer's status as a law enforcement officer; or

   (b)   Any paid or volunteer firefighter acting in the performance of the firefighter's duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the duties of a firefighter; or

   (c)   Any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services acting in the performance of the person's duties while in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of emergency first-aid or medical services; or

   (d)   Any school board member, school administrator, teacher, school bus driver, or other employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a member or employee of a public or nonpublic school or school board or any school bus driver employed by an operator under contract to a public or nonpublic school or school board while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the person's status as a school bus driver; or

   (e)   Any employee of the Division of Child Protection and Permanency while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the employee's duties or because of the status as an employee of the division; or

   (f)   Any justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Superior Court, judge of the Tax Court or municipal judge while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of judicial duties or because of the status as a member of the judiciary; or

   (g)   Any operator of a motorbus or the operator's supervisor or any employee of a rail passenger service while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the person's duties or because of the status as an operator of a motorbus or as the operator's supervisor or as an employee of a rail passenger service; or

   (h)   Any Department of Corrections employee, county correctional police officer, juvenile correctional police officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer or any sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer acting in the performance of the person's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the person's authority or because of the status as a Department of Corrections employee, county correctional police officer, juvenile correctional police officer, State juvenile facility employee, juvenile detention staff member, juvenile detention officer, probation officer, sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff's officer; or

   (i)   Any employee, including any person employed under contract, of a utility company as defined in section 2 of P.L.1971, c.224 (C.2A:42-86) or a cable television company subject to the provisions of the "Cable Television Act," P.L.1972, c.186 (C.48:5A-1 et seq.) while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the performance of the employee's duties in regard to connecting, disconnecting, or repairing or attempting to connect, disconnect, or repair any gas, electric, or water utility, or cable television or telecommunication service; or

   (j)   Any health care worker employed by a licensed health care facility to provide direct patient care, any health care professional licensed or otherwise authorized pursuant to Title 26 or Title 45 of the Revised Statutes to practice a health care profession, except a direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession; or

   (k)   Any direct care worker at a State or county psychiatric hospital or State developmental center or veterans' memorial home, while clearly identifiable as being engaged in the duties of providing direct patient care or practicing the health care profession, provided that the actor is not a patient or resident at the facility who is classified by the facility as having a mental illness or developmental disability; or

   (6)   Causes bodily injury to another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor vehicle in violation of subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted in bodily injury to another person; or

   (7)   Attempts to cause significant bodily injury to another or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life recklessly causes such significant bodily injury; or

   (8)   Causes bodily injury by knowingly or purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel involved in fire suppression activities, rendering emergency medical services resulting from the fire or explosion or rescue operations, or rendering any necessary assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, including any bodily injury sustained while responding to the scene of a reported fire or explosion.  For purposes of this paragraph, "emergency services personnel" shall include, but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer firefighter, any person engaged in emergency first-aid or medical services and any law enforcement officer.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a person shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which resulted in bodily injury to any emergency services personnel; or

   (9)   Knowingly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, points or displays a firearm, as defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or

   (10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm, as defined in subsection v. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate, threaten, or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful purpose; or

   (11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or device, or a system or device which, in the manner used, would cause a reasonable person to believe that it is a laser sighting system or device, against a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of the officer's duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of the officer's authority.  As used in this paragraph, "laser sighting system or device" means any system or device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the firearm; or

   (12) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury or causes significant bodily injury purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly causes significant bodily injury to a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19); or

   (13) Knowingly or, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, recklessly obstructs the breathing or blood circulation of a person who, with respect to the actor, meets the definition of a victim of domestic violence, as defined in subsection d. of section 3 of P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-19), by applying pressure on the throat or neck or blocking the nose or mouth of such person, thereby causing or attempting to cause bodily injury. 

   Aggravated assault under paragraphs (1) and (6) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the second degree; under paragraphs (2), (7), (9), and (10) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree; under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the fourth degree; and under paragraph (5) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. Aggravated assault under paragraph (8) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a crime of the second degree.  Aggravated assault under paragraph (11) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree.  Aggravated assault under paragraph (12) or (13) of subsection b. of this section is a crime of the third degree but the presumption of non-imprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 for a first offense of a crime of the third degree shall not apply. 

   c. (1) A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to another.  Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. 

   (2)   Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person drives the vehicle while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) and bodily injury results. 

   (3)   Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:

   (a)   on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

   (b)   driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

   (c)   driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution. 

   Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if bodily injury results from the defendant operating the auto or vessel in violation of this paragraph.

   A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of paragraph (3) of this subsection.

   It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing.  Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph (3) of this subsection that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session. 

   (4)   Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and serious bodily injury results and is a crime of the fourth degree if the person purposely drives a vehicle in an aggressive manner directed at another vehicle and bodily injury results.  For purposes of this paragraph, "driving a vehicle in an aggressive manner" shall include, but is not limited to, unexpectedly altering the speed of the vehicle, making improper or erratic traffic lane changes, disregarding traffic control devices, failing to yield the right of way, or following another vehicle too closely.

   As used in this subsection, "vessel" means a means of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

   d.   A person who is employed by a facility as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection a. of this section upon an institutionalized elderly person as defined in section 2 of P.L.1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.

   e.   (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2001, c.443).

   f.   A person who commits a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection a. of this section in the presence of a child under 16 years of age at a school or community sponsored youth sports event is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree.  The defendant shall be strictly liable upon proof that the offense occurred, in fact, in the presence of a child under 16 years of age.  It shall not be a defense that the defendant did not know that the child was present or reasonably believed that the child was 16 years of age or older.  The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to create any liability on the part of a participant in a youth sports event or to abrogate any immunity or defense available to a participant in a youth sports event.  As used in this act, "school or community sponsored youth sports event" means a competition, practice, or instructional event involving one or more interscholastic sports teams or youth sports teams organized pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter or which are member teams in a youth league organized by or affiliated with a county or municipal recreation department and shall not include collegiate, semi-professional or professional sporting events.

   amended 1979, c.178, s.22; 1981, c.290, s.14; 1983, c.101; 1985, c.97, s.2; 1985, c.444; 1990, c.87, s.1; 1991, c.237, s.2; 1991, c.341, s.2; 1993, c.219, s.2; 1995, c.6, s.1; 1995, c.181; 1995, c.211, s.1; 1995, c.307, s.2; 1997, c.42; 1997, c.119; 1999, c.77; 1999, c.185, s.2; 1999, c.281; 1999, c.381; 2001, c.215; 2001, c.443, s.2; 2002, c.53; 2003, c.218; 2005, c.2; 2006, c.78, s.2; 2010, c.109; 2012, c.3; 2012, c.16, s.6; 2012, c.22, s.2; 2015, c.98, s.1; 2015, c.100, s.1; 2017, c.240; 2019, c.219, s.3.

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF J.S. (12-06-00713)

IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT OF J.S. (12-06-00713)

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether an out of state conviction for an offense classified as a crime in a foreign jurisdiction acts as a bar to the expungement petition of a successful graduate from the drug court program, when that same offense is classified as a motor vehicle offense in New Jersey? During his term on special probation, the petitioner was arrested in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and charged with driving under the influence. J.S. was convicted of this charge on January 3, 2017. Under Pennsylvania law, this DUI charge is graded as a misdemeanor level crime. The Prosecutor opposed this petition for expungement on the basis that petitioner had been charged and convicted of a crime in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania while a participant in the drug court program.

The court found that the Pennsylvania DUI conviction is not a statutory bar to this drug court graduate’s expungement because: (1) there exists a strong presumption towards expungement; (2) petitioner completed the drug court’s rigorous monitoring program, and; (3) such an offense, under the laws of the State of New Jersey, does not constitute a crime, disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense.

Municipal Court 101 Seminar Speakers: Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq. Orange Prosecutor Gracia Montilus, Esq., Peter H. Lederman, Esq., Joshua H. Reinitz, Esq., Ronald P. Mondello, Esq.,

Municipal Court 101 Seminar

Speakers: 

Kenneth A. Vercammen, Esq.

Orange Prosecutor Gracia Montilus, Esq.,

Peter H. Lederman, Esq.,    

Joshua H. Reinitz, Esq.,
Ronald P. Mondello, Esq., 

Also speaking Hon. Ashlie C. Gibbons J.M.C., Newark Municipal Court
Hon. Harry D. Norton Jr., J.M.C., Pascack Joint Municipal Court 

May 15 4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Central Ballroom A/B

NJSBA Annual Meeting    Wednesday

Borgata Hotel 1 Borgata Way, Atlantic City, NJ 08401

 Description:
    This is an introduction to municipal court for recently admitted attorneys or for attorneys who is new to the practice area or wants a refresher. Experienced practitioners and judges will discuss important procedures, practical information and practice tips.

https://tcms.njsba.com/personifyebusiness/MeetingsEvents/2019AnnualMeetingandConvention/EducationalAgenda.aspx

Law Students free (must register by phone or faxed in registration form)For more information, call NJSBA meetings Dept at 732-249-5000

______________

   Free Office Space for Transitional or New Attorney and work with Metuchen Public Defender and go to Court & Mentor program- Edison, NJ 

        The Metuchen Public Defender Kenneth Vercammen has a space sharing opportunity for new lawyer or recent Transitional attorney to get experience and go to court and learn NJ Law office procedures and handle some Municipal court cases. This is a mentoring experience where you can learn NJ Law Office Procedure.  If interested, fax, mail, fax or email a resume and cover letter.

KENNETH VERCAMMEN, Esq. Metuchen Public Defender

2053 Woodbridge Ave. Edison, NJ 08817 (Phone) 732-572-0500 

(Fax) 732-572-0030 vercammenlaw@njlaws.comhttps://www.njlaws.com/office_space.html